Marco Levytsky, NP-UN Western Bureau Chief.
Canada can use its influence within NATO to help Ukraine enter into a security agreement with other East European countries, says a Kyiv-based expert on Ukrainian affairs.
“If you would only look at the political map of Europe you would know there is a problem because you have countries like Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia that are not in a security structure,” said Andreas Umland during the 52nd Annual Shevchenko lecture in Edmonton.
A security structure that could resolve this issue would be one which consisted of the “Bucharest 9” members of NATO plus non-NATO members like Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia, all of whom feel threatened by Russia, he said during the question and answer period of the lecture which was co-sponsored by the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Alberta, the Ukrainian Professional and Business Association of Edmonton and the Alberta Foundation for Ukrainian Education Studies Society.
The Bucharest 9 are the nine post-Communist East-Central European states who have joined NATO after the collapse of the USSR, namely Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria.
“Despite all the current tensions between Poland and Ukraine, (there is) a lot of interest and sympathy and a lot of well-informed national interest in Poland as to the stability and security of Ukraine,” explained Umland, an associate professor of European studies in the department of political science at the National University of “Kyiv-Mohyla Academy” in Ukraine.
“However, Poland is afraid to engage itself more intensely with Ukraine… because Polish politicians fear that if they start engaging with Ukraine in the military field that will then weaken the security guarantees that Poland has with NATO. So that there is sort of a red line that Poland or Romania or other countries may cross and then their own security would be limited. And here a country like Canada could come in and could start discussing, for instance, with the US, whether the US could provide major non-NATO status to Ukraine, whether the US could give some assurances to Warsaw, to Romania and say: ‘Guys, if you want to be active beyond the borders of NATO, we’re going to cover your back. So, if you give security assurances to Ukraine, if you engage militarily with Ukraine… article 5 of the NATO treaty will still be there fully for you.’ That is where I could see a country like Canada playing a role because that is not something that people think about in Washington,” he added
“(There is an opinion in the US, that) we don’t want to extend NATO because then we would get into a conflict with Russia and Ukraine is not that important, but for countries like Poland Slovakia and Romania that are neighbours of Ukraine …it would be in their own national interest to support Ukraine but then they would have to be reassured by NATO that their own security will not be diminished,” elaborated Umland, noting that a precedent for such an arrangements exists with Turkey, a NATO member who has had a security agreement with Azerbaijan since 2010.
He was responding to a question from Oliver Rossier who asked what a middle power like Canada could do, adding “is there any Canadian bacon in the Ukrainian sandwich?”
The latter was a reference to Umland’s earlier mention of the “sandwich model” of reforms, whereby international donor and civil society pressure government institutions from both sides to initiate reforms.
As outlined by Graeme Robertson and Grigore Pop-Eleches in a January 5, 2018 article in the Washington Post: “Domestic civil society activists pressure the government for reform from one side; the international community does so from another. The activists propose reform ideas and monitor the government for backsliding. The international community uses money and leverage to pressure the government to adopt reforms and to punish any backsliding. The idea is that together they might be able to squeeze the reluctant, often hostile, government into action.”
Umland explained that the stress imposed upon the Ukrainian state by the war with Russia has created enormous opportunities for international donors insofar as leverage is concerned. In addition, civil society learned its lessons from the failure of the Orange Revolution and did not demobilize as it did earlier but put considerable effort into maintaining a sustainable long-term alliance to push for reform.
Umland cited this as one of the many paradoxes that have emerged from Russia’s hybrid war. Another is that the Russian disinformation war has refocused attention on Eastern Europe in the West. Still another is that it has created a process of decentralization which has led to the devolution of power from the centre to the local levels of government. This has neutralized the Russian tactic of federalization and, in turn, strengthened Ukrainian national unity.
Umland stated that now it is also necessary to think about new instruments respond to the challenges Ukraine faces.
One such example is the question of weapons delivery which two years ago was not under consideration but now is being seriously considered. Another is the idea of a UN peacekeeping operation. The surprise is that Russian President Vladimir Putin is considering it. There may come a point at which the Kremlin starts to take socio-economic factors into consideration and decides it wants to get rid of the sanctions being imposed on Russia in which case Putin may look for a face-saving way to get out of the Donbas. However, one should not overestimate the significance of the peacekeeping idea, because while it may provide some security it would only be there for a limited time on a limited territory and would not solve the long-term security problem for Ukraine.
Therefore, continued Umland, other instruments need to be talked about and they include European integration, the security arrangements beyond the Donbas and how to implement the Minsk Agreements should the need arise.
Regarding European integration, Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia need a membership perspective. For Ukraine the approach may be not to follow the example of Poland and Slovakia but of the Western Balkan countries like Croatia, Slovenia, Serbia and Montenegro, some of who are already EU members and others are on the path to becoming members. They are in a similar situation as Ukraine and Ukraine should study some of the structures that have been created by the EU for their integration. This would involve adopting the rules and culture of the EU.
Another instrument is the Three Seas initiative. It aims to connect the East European member countries of the European Union in terms of transportation and communications. So far it only involves the EU members but remains something to explore for Ukraine in terms of participation.
With the Minsk agreements, the trick would be for Ukraine to make the terms both domestically acceptable and internationally satisfactory.
Both civil society and the government reject the special status for the occupied territories that is called for in the agreements. Here Ukraine can apply a parallel power structure of prefects who represent the president in the regions.
“The problem with the Minsk Agreements is not so much that Russia would be unhappy if the special status is not really implemented as it imagines it should be… but that the West has also been part of the negotiations for the Minsk Agreements and, in particular Germany and France… and Ukraine would have to come up with a proposal to the West where it would formally fulfill the political part of the Minsk Agreements, but on the other hand, through decentralization and through such instruments as the amalgamation of territories, and through the introduction of a parallel power structure involving prefects and special National Guard units… would leave these territories under (its) full control.”
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